An Introduction to General Disarmament

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INTRODUCTION

The Program on General Disarmament at the University of Maryland, College Park, is a 10-year, integrated program of research, analysis, international networking, training, and public education. It is dedicated to studying general and complete disarmament (GCD) as a serious area of research, education, and public concern.

Through this program, we hope to generate a dialogue about the possibilities for GCD throughout academia and the policy community. We have an active research program already underway, as well as a growing graduate and professional fellowship program. We are also offering our first course in spring 2000: Seminar in International Relations and World Politics: Issues in General Disarmament. We also intend to sponsor international conferences and meetings, continue curriculum development and prepare other educational materials on issues in general disarmament. This brief is the first publication in a planned series of research reports and briefing papers on opportunities for and obstacles to general disarmament.

This background piece consists of three main sections. The first section describes new challenges and opportunities that are available in the post-Cold War era. It also provides an overview of some of the potential benefits of disarmament, including political, military, social, economic, and environmental factors. The second section of the piece gives a short history of general disarmament efforts to date. It is followed by a brief assessment of the state of disarmament today.

NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Why should the world seek general disarmament now, when the Cold War tensions and flashpoints are gone, and at least theoretically fingers are further from “the button”? Although the Berlin Wall may have come down, the weapons produced by the superpowers still exist and are being replaced by new generations with ever-increasing lethality. Regional and sub-regional conflicts rage around the world, including literally dozens of “hot wars”. But today there are reasons to believe that disarmament efforts might meet with more success than in the past.

Cold War security policies left little room for consideration of disarmament, despite successive presidents’ rhetorical commitment to the principle. But the end of the Cold War provides room for serious discussion of general disarmament. This may ultimately offer the potential to forge the kind of international regime that eluded the peace-makers at the end of the “hot” World Wars.

General and Complete Disarmament is a concept in need of increased attention for several reasons:

Although nuclear arms limitations receive most of the disarmament headlines, it is clear that conventional weapons, and particularly light weapons, have
caused the vast majority of the world’s combat deaths during the nuclear era. Without attention to other weapons, nuclear disarmament merely makes the world safe for non-nuclear war;

In many regions of the world, nuclear disarmament probably cannot be achieved without reductions in conventional forces. There are some states that feel threatened by rivals with large conventional advantages, and therefore have incorporated nuclear weapons into the heart of their defense posture. Israel, Russia, Pakistan, and a handful of other states are not likely to agree to nuclear disarmament without accompanying conventional arms reduction agreements;

Renewed rivalry is not the only route the world may take to armageddon - accidents and miscalculation are potential “extinction level events” in a world full of weapons of mass destruction. The command and control of the massive post-Soviet arsenal is not assured - the chances of even their most sophisticated weaponry falling into the hands of other states, or even non-state actors, are disturbingly high.\(^1\) The vulnerability of the former Soviet arms archipelago is one of the most pressing reasons to pursue the immediate elimination of as many of those weapons as possible.

There are many potential benefits of disarmament, including military, politics, economic, social and environmental. Among the benefits, and possible areas for our initial research, are the following:

Decreasing the likelihood of war and international conflict -- as arms races tend to exacerbate tensions,\(^2\) so do negotiated, verified build-downs encourage cooperation and mutual trust, as we have seen in Europe over the past decade and a half.

Preventing new superpower rivalries -- the potential for a new cold war, possibly between the Atlantic powers and China, is disturbingly real. Sustaining a dialogue toward and possibly creating regional and/or global disarmament regimes could play a significant role in ameliorating (or at least dissipating into peaceful avenues) this conflict.

Minimizing the damage of conflict -- as the focus on light weapons has reminded us in recent years, the vast majority of deaths have occurred in small-scale conflicts involving small arms and light weapons. The continued military production process in the major powers contributes to the militarization of conflicts through the rest of the world as excess yet commercially viable


\(^2\) For more on this point, see Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, “The Centrality of the Bomb,” Foreign Policy, No. 94 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-21.
weapons are transferred from the producing nations via the international arms markets (legitimate, gray market, and black market sales).

Improving global economies -- decreasing global military spending would free resources for necessary investments in education, development, sanitation, health, poverty relief, hunger relief, and other social needs.

Intellectual resources -- scientific capacity has been greatly diverted to non-productive areas by military demands.

Enhancing cultural and social progress -- the effects of militarization on social attitudes and behavior have been largely highly undesirable.

Increasing the sustainability of democracy -- arguments for the primacy of national security have been used to subvert global freedom, free flows of information, and democracy.

Preserving the environment -- the immense costs of clean-up facing the US Department of Energy are only one aspect of the many negative environmental consequences of military production. Others include jet fuel pollution, noise pollution of aircraft, and long-term effects of advanced weapons such as depleted uranium rounds.

PAST DISARMAMENT EFFORTS

The end of great wars has periodically lead to a reexamination of the international system, from the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 at the end of the Napoleonic wars to the establishment of the United Nations at the end of World War II. The negotiations following the defeat of Napoleon first gave rise to the notion that war could be abolished, or at least controlled, by multilateral disarmament. In 1816, Czar Alexander I of Russia proposed, “a simultaneous reduction of armed forces of all kinds which the powers have brought into being to preserve the safety and independence of their peoples.”3 But it would take another, more horrible war for the rest of the great powers to begin to agree.

At the turn of the century, the nations of the world discussed disarmament at the largely unsuccessful first and second Hague conferences, called by Czar Nicholas II. President William McKinley stated that, “it behooves us as a nation to lend countenance and aid to the beneficent project.”4 Several agreements on rules of war were successfully completed, but little progress was made on any of the broader arms limitation topics. The second


conference (1907) failed to successfully address the topic either. However, US leaders, including President Theodore Roosevelt, saw arms limitations as a potential avenue to reducing great power tensions. In 1910 the US Congress passed a unanimous resolution asking the President to appoint experts to “consider the expedience of utilizing existing international agencies for the purpose of limiting the armaments of the nations of the world by international agreement.”

Disarmament proposals were not taken seriously enough to prevent the outbreak of the first “war to end war.” Out of the ashes of the carnage came the first sustained attempt at collective security and arms limitations. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points for a proper settlement of World War I, issued in 1918, included “adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.” The essence of Wilson's brainchild, the League of Nations, was "that States should renounce their right to be the sole judges of their own armaments".

In the 1920s, members of the League of Nations sought to realize the commitment of the League Covenant, which directed members to reduce arms to "the lowest point consistent with national safety." Toward that end, members of the League established an independent Preparatory Disarmament Commission in 1926. President Calvin Coolidge endorsed the idea, explaining that “the conviction that the competitive augmentation of national armaments has been one of the principle causes of international suspicion and ill-will, leading to war, is firmly held by the American Government and people.”

In 1927, the head of the Soviet delegation to the League of Nations, Maxim Litvinov, proposed “complete and general disarmament,” including abolishing all standing armies, the "war industry," and military schools within four years. This and other contemporary proposals never gained a great deal of support - it was widely observed at the time that “nobody would have been more surprised than Litvinov had his proposals been taken seriously.” Yet the Litvinov proposal was a reflection of the peaceful spirit of the age, which led to arms control agreements on arsenals and on navies, and symbolic

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7 For a contemporary account, see Noel Baker, Disarmament (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1926).


10 For the full text of this and many other arms control proposals and agreements, see Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, eds., Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament (Dunn Loring, VA: T.N. Dupuy Associates, 1973), p. 138.

11 Roberts, p. 287.

12 Dupuy and Hammerman, p. 156.
commitments to peace such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact which pledged its signatories to renounce war as a component of policy.\textsuperscript{13}

In 1932, the United States presented the "Hoover Plan" to the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The plan included sweeping rollbacks of all offensive weaponry, including "the abolition of all tanks, all chemical warfare, and all large mobile guns," and suggested a "total prohibition of bombardment from the air" and major reductions of armed forces, battleships, submarines, aircraft carriers, and cruisers.\textsuperscript{14} Franklin D. Roosevelt endorsed President Hoover’s approach in 1933. In a message to the World Disarmament Conference, Roosevelt presented a staged plan of disarmament, declaring the "objective ... must be the complete elimination of all offensive weapons."\textsuperscript{15}

In fact, Presidents Hoover, Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all endorsed disarmament on a broad scale. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, and Clinton have all signed agreements committing the United States to pursue a General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) Treaty. US policy has not only recognized a GCD Treaty as a formal goal, but the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations put forward coherent proposals -- and strategic paths to achieve them -- which dealt with the question of overall or comprehensive disarmament.

The international optimism that followed the First Great War did not last long - Hitler ignored the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and began a new program of arms production, propelling Europe and the world into renewed hostile rivalry. This breakdown of the League’s arms control regime and the cessation of momentum toward general disarmament show the destabilizing effects that a single nation can have on the international system.

The next few decades of attempts to create a stable peace were directed to the newly-created United Nations, but were continually hampered by the Cold War. This is despite the fact that the UN Charter explicitly commits all members of the United Nations to establish “a system for the regulation of armaments.”\textsuperscript{16}

Bernard Baruch presented the Truman Administration’s plan for international control of atomic technology, and “illegal use” of all other weapons, to the United Nations in 1946.\textsuperscript{17} Negotiations between the Americans and the Soviets on this proposal (and the Soviet counter-proposal -- the Gromyko plan\textsuperscript{18}), were largely for propaganda purposes. There is

\textsuperscript{13} Dupuy and Hammerman, p. 155.

\textsuperscript{14} Dupuy and Hammerman, pp. 190-92.

\textsuperscript{15} Dupuy and Hammerman, pp. 253-54.


\textsuperscript{17} Dupuy and Hammerman, pp. 301-08.

\textsuperscript{18} Dupuy and Hammerman, pp. 308-12.
ample evidence Baruch knew the Soviets were unlikely to respond favorably to his plan,\textsuperscript{19} which would have required the Soviets to accept US superiority in nuclear technology for an indefinite period.

In December 1946, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution recommending that the Security Council pay attention to the, “general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some of the participants.”\textsuperscript{20} The Security Council responded with the creation of the Commission on Conventional Armaments, which met with as little success as negotiations on nuclear issues and went through several reincarnations in the late 1940s and early 1950s.\textsuperscript{21} Rather than negotiating, the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged unrealistic proposals, requiring either inspections without disarmament or disarmament without inspection.\textsuperscript{22}

In the mid-1950s, these talks took on a more positive dimension; Stalin's death and Eisenhower's "atoms-for-peace" speech were both important in the changing atmosphere. In June 1954, France and Britain submitted a memorandum to the Five-Power Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, offering a staged program "as a possible basis for compromise."\textsuperscript{23} The Soviets declared it was willing to accept the proposal as a basis to negotiate. The United States, under Eisenhower's leadership, also made compromises to accept the French/British framework. And in May 1955, the Soviets offered the most comprehensive plan yet introduced.\textsuperscript{24} Intensive discussions on a broad range of issues involved were held in 1957 in a subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Committee after the United States presented a new plan for partial disarmament.\textsuperscript{25} The talks broke down over disagreements over Germany and other problems.

In September 1959, Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev launched the most promising period of disarmament negotiations with a speech at the United Nations, proposing to reduce conventional forces to lightly armed militia and to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Krushchev stated that all nations "should divest themselves of the means of waging war."\textsuperscript{26} Secretary

\textsuperscript{19}For more on this, see Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976).


\textsuperscript{22} See Myrdal, esp. chapters 5 and 6.


\textsuperscript{24} Dupuy and Hammerman, p. 373.

\textsuperscript{25} Dupuy and Hammerman, p. 420

\textsuperscript{26} Dupuy and Hammerman, p. 445.
of State Christian Herter responded to the initiative positively, commenting "the type of disarmament that Mr. Kruchshev has spoken about is a highly desirable thing for mankind. From that point of view it must be taken very seriously." 27

The General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 1378 in November of 1959, stating that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today."28 The newly-created Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was directed to work out such a treaty in detail. Shortly thereafter, the Eisenhower Administration proposed a World Court backed "by international armed force" combined with disarmament -- "to the point where no single nation or group of nations could effectively oppose this enforcement of international law by international machinery..."29

The Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament negotiations, begun in March 1960, quickly broke down. The Western states sought to negotiate preliminary limitations, an approach the representatives of the East Bloc countries found unacceptable.30

Soon after entering office, President John Kennedy created the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and appointed John McCloy as his special advisor on disarmament. McCloy and the new agency undertook a full review of US policy in this field. The Soviets pressed for an early resumption of negotiations on disarmament proposals. Talks resulted in the McCloy-Zorin Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (named for McCloy and Valerian Zorin, a Soviet special Ambassador and Deputy Foreign Minister), a set of guidelines for negotiations. The McCloy-Zorin Agreement was perhaps the closest the world has come to a successful framework for negotiating a GCD treaty. Issued September 20, 1961, the "Agreed Principles" called for a treaty which would: (1) Establish general and complete disarmament and peaceful settlement of disputes; (2) eliminate all forces, except those necessary for maintaining internal order; (3) establish manpower for a "United Nations peace force"; (4) proceed by stages of disarmament, which would not create advantage to any state; and (5) provide for "strict and effective international control" and verification of the disarmament process.31

Working from the "Agreed Principles," a new Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) of the United Nations engaged in article-by-article negotiations on the Soviet and American proposals for multi-stage general and complete disarmament treaties in Geneva from 1962 to 1964. There were disagreements over the schedule for eliminating missile

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28 See Corrandini, p. 1046.


31 For more details and further commentary upon the Agreed Principles, and upon the Soviet and U.S. proposals for general and complete disarmament, see Larry Weiler, "General Disarmament Proposals," Arms Control Today, July/August 1986, pp. 6-15. For the texts, see Dupuy and Hammerman, pp. 469-502.
launchers, military bases, an end to fissile material production, and the categories of weapons to which verification would apply. Although negotiators made some progress, more limited approaches began to dominate the agenda. Unfortunately, attention shifted to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in the mid-sixties and has remained focused on partial arms control measures ever since.

Lyndon Johnson signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, Article VI of which explicitly commits the United States (and the other signatories) to not only the principle of disarmament, but also to "pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." President Bill Clinton signed the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, reaffirming that promise.

The General Assembly has renewed calls for a GCD on several occasions, notably in 1969 and in 1978. In 1978, the first Special Session on Disarmament outlined an international disarmament program, which would give priority to nuclear disarmament and increase the role played by members of the General Assembly vis a vis the permanent members of the Security Council. A second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982 failed to result in any progress beyond the finding of the first. Neither special session was successful in bringing the major powers back to the discussion of general disarmament. However, a commitment to pursue a GCD treaty has also been included in the preamble of virtually every major multi-lateral disarmament accord since 1960.

Since the 1960s, the momentum toward GCD has shifted toward the arena of "strategic arms control." Although many helpful multilateral treaties emerged over the next few decades, strategic arms control negotiations still allowed regulated advancement of the arms race, and they have often been used to limit public opposition to continued militarization and to allow efficient force modernization. If agreements limit the number of a given platform at a certain number, it does not limit qualitative improvements (let alone generational advances to completely new weapons). The focus on strategic arms control was used to increasingly marginalize disarmament within "establishment" circles as utopian and unachievable.

However, although momentum toward general disarmament stalled, there was significant progress in limiting some aspects of the arms race. Indeed, it may have been that during the Cold War little more than piecemeal attempts at arms control were possible. There is no doubt that there was genuine concern about the arms race which was beginning to spin out

32 Dupuy and Hammerman, p. 559.
34 Piasecki and Gati, p. 759.
of control. Although none of the Cold War arms control agreements addressed the issue as in a realistic, holistic fashion, they do show that even in times of high stress and insecurity states can recognize that arms control can serve their strategic interests.

To put GCD back as the focus of arms control discussions, perhaps some of the historic proposals, notably the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan (the original model upon which Baruch designed his plan), the Baruch Plan (which remained the US general disarmament position up to 1955), and the McCloy-Zorin "Agreed Principles" of the early 1960s, should be referenced as major resources of information and carefully developed policy thought. These attempts need to be reassessed, and possibly rehabilitated and modernized, for the post-Cold War era and the 21st century.

THE STATE OF DISARMAMENT TODAY

Input into progress toward GCD today is coming from many sources. One of the most intriguing and influential is the proposed treaty process authored by former Ambassador Jonathan Dean, Randall Caroline Forsberg, and Saul Mendlovitz entitled Global Action to Prevent War: A Coalition-Building Effort to Stop War, Genocide and Other Forms of Deadly Conflict.36 Ambassador Dean, formerly the US chief negotiator at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, and his co-authors imagine that the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process created at the time of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 could provide the forum for pushing signatories on their commitment to “general and complete disarmament.” The authors have begun to build a wide-ranging coalition of organizations and individuals to address the global problem of organized violence, examining military issues as well as poverty, human rights violations, environmental degradation, and all forms of discrimination. Their coalition recognizes that the roots of violence can only be addressed with a combination of conflict resolution, arms control, peacekeeping and respect for human dignity.

The Dean, Forsberg and Mendlovitz program envisions a multi-stage evolution toward the establishment of a permanent global security system. Each stage would last five to ten years, and involve gradual cuts in armaments and military spending, confidence-building measures, and increased reliance on multilateral international institutions, especially the United Nations. Each phase would be made into law with a Treaty to Reduce Armed Conflict (TRAC I-IV). Instead of “striving for peace in fragments,” as has been the case for arms control negotiations over the last few decades, the Global Action International Network (GAIN) feels that the nations of the world must, “bring together these diverse approaches—conventional force cuts, limits on arms production and trade, cuts in military spending, measures to stop proliferation and build confidence, training for peaceful conflict resolution, and means for peacebuilding, and peacekeeping—in a unified program to prevent war.”37

36 Further information about GAIN, the Global Action International Network, is available on their website, http://www.globalactionpw.org.

There exists a growing consensus that the nuclear force structure must change. Perhaps the strongest voice in the “nuclear abolition” debate has been from “establishment” figures with military credentials, such as General Lee Butler (Ret.), former Commander in Chief of the US Strategic Air Command. He and over one hundred other retired senior military officials from seventeen nations have signed a petition stating that the world must rid itself of nuclear weapons, which stirred controversy in defense circles and put the disarmament issue back on the agenda, and perhaps marked its arrival as a legitimate policy option.38

Today, as former disarmament negotiator Lawrence Weiler observes, the unprecedented opportunity for international cooperation is coupled with the fact that many of the obstacles that stood in the way of earlier disarmament efforts have been overcome or have simply disappeared: "Significant elements of what in the West's view would be a first or even second stage [towards general disarmament] have been or soon will be achieved, de jure or de facto."39 These include the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, conventional arms rollback in Europe, agreements on outer space, biological warfare, and chemical warfare, and a nuclear test ban. Moreover, the long US-Soviet Cold War struggle over what to do about Germany is no longer an issue. And the once- vexing question of mutual verification - various technological advances (in satellite imaging, for instance), as well as an established United Nations precedent for on-the-ground inspection teams, create the possibility that arms control agreements negotiated today will be more reliable than those of years past.

From the American perspective, GCD seems to be a viable and attractive option. As former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stated, nuclear weapons level a playing field that would otherwise tilt in favor of the United States.40 Lesser powers with weapons of mass destruction play roles on the world stage completely out of proportion to their actual importance - therefore, the elimination of such weapons may well be in the vital national interests of the United States. Plus, one of the greatest threats to American security over the next few decades will be posed by non-state actors. Since few terrorists have the ability to manufacture their own weapons, any international effort to reduce the size of arsenals will necessarily reduce the potential for weapons falling into the wrong hands. There simply is no safety in numbers as far as weapons are concerned.

CONCLUSION

Is the idea of general and complete disarmament a utopian dream, destined to fail as long as people know how to make weapons, and know how to hate? Perhaps the ultimate goal

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of a weapon-free world is unattainable in our lifetime. But reductions in armaments, and the
benefits for security they would entail, are possible and desirable. Even the process of
discussing such reductions could help reverse the self-fulfilling threat perception that
accompanies arms races.

The time is right for increased attention to disarmament. We at the University of Maryland
hope to address some of the many questions and uncertainties relating to these issues. We
must act now if we are to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the end of the Cold
War to create a new international system that relies less on power and force, and more on
justice and peace. The alternative is a return to Cold War attitudes and mindsets, and the
resulting costs in terms of lives and national resources. This program provides a unique
opportunity to examine the opportunities and obstacles

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